[Kiho Han's Column] The Western Front DMZ Explosion Incident: What Was Hidden by Political Strife

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

On September 21, soldiers of the Army's 25th Infantry Division were involved in an explosion believed to be caused by a landmine while conducting a search route clearing operation in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the western front. At the time, two explosions occurred near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), injuring three soldiers, including the search battalion commander, some of whom sustained serious injuries. The very fact that soldiers performing duties in the most dangerous field under state orders suffered severe injuries is the heaviest "fact" of this accident.

However, immediately after the accident, a heated debate erupted in political circles regarding the source of the explosives, the timing of the on-site investigation, and the military's response. With it not even definitively confirmed whether the landmines were newly planted by North Korea, previously laid by friendly forces, or lost from North Korea, the controversy over responsibility for the military's initial response dominated most of the holiday headlines. Of course, if there were problems with the military's response, they must be thoroughly investigated. Identifying the cause of the accident and examining whether there were any issues with operational procedures, command and reporting systems, and safety management systems is a positive function of democratic control. However, when political disputes take precedence before the cause of the accident and the allocation of responsibility are confirmed, the essence of uncovering the truth and preventing recurrence can be obscured.

The perspective on this accident must be fixed not on political blame games, but on the realistic dangers inherent in the DMZ, the physical boundary of the division. The DMZ is distinct from general military operational zones. Landmines have been laid for a long time since the Armistice Agreement, and there is a possibility that they may shift or be washed away due to heavy rainfall or changes in terrain. Furthermore, with North Korea continuing recent military actions in the DMZ area, the risks on the ground are taking on an even more complex nature. The task of establishing a new search route is not a simple infantry operation; it is a high-risk mission that simultaneously requires mine detection, terrain analysis, explosive ordnance disposal, surveillance and reconnaissance, and consultation with the United Nations Command. In this process, the top priority is the safety of our military.

The military's principle of safety management lies in accurately assessing risks and taking necessary safety measures before the rapid resumption of missions. The 'National Defense Safety Directive' mandates the implementation of risk assessments and reduction measures during the execution of national defense missions, and stipulates that necessary safety measures must be taken regarding risks at locations where explosives or accidents may occur. Therefore, even when re-accessing an area where a landmine explosion occurred, it is in accordance with principle to assess additional risks and ensure the safety of deployed personnel before entering the site, rather than simply prioritizing the speed of the investigation. Although criticism was raised regarding the delay in the on-site investigation following the accident, the military explained that immediately after the incident, they analyzed soldiers' statements, equipment, gunpowder residue, and fragments removed during surgery, and prepared for a joint on-site investigation with the United Nations Command and the Military Armistice Commission. On September 26, securing movement routes and surveying the operational environment for the on-site investigation were conducted.

The necessary question here should go beyond "Why wasn't it entered immediately?" to "How will it be entered safely?" While the clarification of the truth must be swift, it must not result in additional casualties. The speed of investigation and the safety of soldiers are not conflicting values, but rather tasks that must be accomplished together.

Another case to refer to in light of this accident is the 2015 wooden box landmine incident. At that time, a wooden box landmine exploded during a search operation in the DMZ, severely injuring two South Korean search team members. Staff Sergeant Ha Jae-heon lost both legs, and Staff Sergeant Kim Jeong-won lost his right leg. A joint investigation by the Ministry of National Defense’s Combat Readiness Inspection Group and the United Nations Command’s Military Armistice Commission Special Investigation Team confirmed that North Korean forces had intentionally planted the landmines across the Military Demarcation Line. This incident demonstrated just how direct North Korea’s military threat can be, while leaving our society with the challenge of how to protect soldiers deployed in dangerous operations.

Now, 11 years later, we must not hastily attribute this accident to the same cause as the 2015 incident. However, the questions raised by both incidents are the same: How thoroughly is the state protecting soldiers deployed to dangerous sites? This question has been omitted from the controversy surrounding this accident.

The government and the military must first scientifically determine the cause of the accident. It is necessary to comprehensively examine not only the type and source of the explosives but also the search route selection process, the sharing of landmine risk information, the adequacy of detection and protection equipment, and the on-site command system and risk assessment procedures. In particular, landmine risks in the DMZ and border areas are difficult to assess solely based on past installation records. Risk levels must be continuously updated by comprehensively considering topographical changes, flood damage, potential loss, and North Korean military activities, and relevant information must be systematically managed and shared.

Search route development and landmine detection also need to evolve into a risk-based operational management system that varies personnel, equipment, detection methods, and access procedures according to the level of risk. Actively utilizing advanced technologies such as unmanned systems and remote sensing to reduce the frequency of personnel directly entering dangerous areas is also a crucial task. Following an accident, a system must be in place to provide long-term support to injured soldiers and their families, covering not only emergency first aid but also treatment, rehabilitation, compensation, and welfare.

The role of the political sphere is also clear. It is only natural for the National Assembly to verify the military's safety management system and demand explanations from the government. However, political strife that begins with a blame game before the cause is even identified, hinders the creation of an environment for investigation, and prepares to distrust even the results, may be the product of 80 years of division that is more dangerous than landmines. It is our duty as we continue to live with the DMZ to uncover the truth of the incident, properly treat the injured soldiers, and ensure that the "next generation of soldiers" are not exposed to the same dangers.

Therefore, a more responsible approach is to support the investigation and evidence gathering until the facts are confirmed, and to demand institutional improvements if problems are discovered. The government and the military must also transparently explain to the public, to the extent possible, the reasons for the delay in the investigation, the facts confirmed so far, and additional safety measures. If transparency is lacking, political interpretations and suspicions will fill the void.

If the investigation confirms that this accident was caused by additional landmines laid during the fortification of the DMZ following North Korea's severance of ties with the South (the Declaration of Two Hostile States in December 2023), this constitutes an act of military threat rather than a mere accident, and North Korea must be held accountable accordingly. Conversely, if problems are identified in our military's search route clearing operations or safety management, accountability and institutional improvements must follow. What matters most is whether the investigation results lead to the prevention of recurrence.

The purpose of national security extends beyond the narrow concept of military missions to ultimately safeguard the people and the nation. Predicting and mitigating risks for soldiers deployed to dangerous sites for national security, and taking full responsibility when accidents occur, conversely remains the state's duty. Therefore, this accident must serve as an opportunity to create safer DMZ operations, a more sophisticated mine management system, and a more robust protection system for soldiers. The state must move beyond the question of "who is responsible" to ask, "What must be changed to prevent today's tragedy from recurring?" And at the starting point of that question must always be the safety of soldiers performing their duties in dangerous fields for the sake of the nation.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the center.)