[Kiho Han's Column] 'Synchronized Inference' with Rumors of Kim Jong-un's Death

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

"Motivated reasoning," as explained by psychologist Chiba Kunda, focuses on the desires and expectations involved in judging information. When people have a desired conclusion, they readily accept information that aligns with it, while demanding rigorous proof for inconvenient information. Neither the media nor the public—the suppliers and demanders of such information—are exceptions. This is why it is difficult to explain the recurrence of rumors regarding the North Korean leader's death solely through a lack of information, despite them repeatedly proving wrong.

Recently, rumors of Kim Jong-un's death spread once again. The rumors, which originated on overseas social media on October 18, remained intact even after the Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency released photos on the 20th showing him attending the "National Clothing and Footwear Exhibition" in Pyongyang the previous day with Ri Sol-ju and Kim Ju-ae; they only subsided after it was revealed on the 24th that he had met with Wang Huning, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, in Dandong, China. It is reported that the National Intelligence Service informed the National Assembly Intelligence Committee on the 23rd that the death rumors were false.

In the meantime, an inspection of the front lines by Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers' Party, became material for rumors. On October 21, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim Yo-jong inspected a fortification construction site on the southern border accompanied by Defense Ministry advisor Pak Jong-chon. Although North Korean media reported the inspection date as the 20th, Kim Yo-jong unusually issued an immediate statement correcting this, clarifying that the actual visit took place in the early hours of the 21st. Her presence was also captured by South Korean military surveillance equipment. However, this "suspicious" inspection, coupled with the fact that Kim Jong-un had not been reported to have made any public appearances since the 19th, was consumed as circumstantial evidence for rumors. Some media outlets juxtaposed her front-line activities on the 22nd and 23rd with Kim Jong-un's absence within a single article. While the reports did not definitively declare his death, if the death rumors were accepted, Kim Yo-jong's activities would be interpreted as a signal of his consolidation of power, while Kim Jong-un's disappearance would be seen as circumstantial evidence of his passing. As unproven facts were bound together into a single narrative, a "circular argument" was created in which the initial speculation supported itself. One expert’s counter-question—asking whether Kim Yo-jong could have leisurely inspected the front lines if Kim Jong-un had died—was actually closer to common sense.

The media often justifies such reporting as the "public's right to know." However, the right to know is the right to access accurate information necessary for public judgment. While reports stating "there is a rumor circulating" may be factual, it is worth reconsidering whether the public necessity of recirculating such rumors constitutes the duty of the media. When speculation is amplified and reproduced by going beyond mere rumors to include succession plans and scenarios for seizing power, the cost is ultimately borne by the credibility of the public sphere when click counts are justified by borrowing the language of the right to know.

The history of false reports is long. On November 16, 1986, the Chosun Ilbo published an extra edition treating Kim Il-sung's shooting death as a fait accompli, yet Kim Il-sung appeared in public two days later. Hyon Song-wol, Deputy Director of the Workers' Party, who was reported on August 29, 2013, under the headline "Kim Jong-un's former lover and about 10 others executed by firing squad for filming pornography," appeared at the Artists' Convention eight and a half months later, on May 16, 2014. Jo Yong-won, Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party, and Ma Won-chun, Director of the Design Bureau of the State Affairs Commission, were also simultaneously reported as having been purged and executed in 2014 and 2025, respectively, despite reports of their demotions and reinstatements. On February 10, 2016, a government official revealed the execution of Ri Yong-gil, Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, but he "resurrected" from "death" three months later on May 10 with news of his election as a candidate member of the Workers' Party Politburo. In other words, the media was not the sole source of the error. The rumor of Kim Kyong-hee's poisoning, reported by CNN in May 2015, did not easily subside despite the National Intelligence Service's announcement that it was baseless. Her survival was publicly confirmed only on January 25, 2020, four years and eight months after the report, through her attendance at a Lunar New Year performance. In contrast, Kim Yong-chol, an advisor to the Workers' Party Central Committee who was reported to be in forced labor on May 31, 2019, was confirmed to be alive and well just three days later through news of him attending a performance. The arrest of the false report was like a "four-seam fastball," but the correction was slow and sluggish, like an "e-per-ball." It was not until March 2020, marking its 100th anniversary, that the Chosun Ilbo apologized for its report on Hyon Song-wol—six years and six months after the initial report.

The phenomenon of familiar narratives filling the informational voids created by the closed nature of power is not unique to Korea. In September 2022, when Chinese President Xi Jinping remained out of public view for a little over ten days following his return from an overseas trip, rumors of house arrest and a coup circulated; however, he appeared at an exhibition in Beijing on September 27. In March 2015, when Russian President Putin disappeared from public view for about ten days, rumors of health issues and a power shift spread. He reappeared on March 16. In 2012, rumors surrounding Cuba's Fidel Castro regarding his death or critical condition also lost ground in the face of testimonies from interviewees and photographs. However, the division of the Korean Peninsula further amplifies this vulnerability. While access to information regarding North Korea is limited, the impact on our national security is significant; and although our capacity for rapid factual reporting is low, the compulsion to know is immense. When this is combined with hostility and anxiety, even the smallest signs are interpreted as signals of a regime crisis. This collective tendency to immediately weave uncertain information into a narrative of threat is nothing other than so-called "division phobia."

Division phobia is not limited to individual false reports. Predictions that North Korea would soon collapse spread following the collapse of Eastern Europe and German reunification in the early 1990s, as well as the "Arduous March" period following the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. Around 2010, WikiLeaks diplomatic cables revealed that high-ranking government officials had conveyed to the U.S. observations that North Korea could collapse within a few years after Kim Jong-il's death. North Korea did not collapse. Instead, policies based on the premise of collapse skewed toward pressure, and the Kim Young-sam administration was out of sync with the Bill Clinton administration following Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang in 1994. When expectations become predictions and predictions become the premise of policy, the cost borne by public opinion formed by "synchronized reasoning" increases. Since the likelihood of the public correcting this tendency while paying political costs is low, the social momentum for fact-checking loses its power.

The boundaries between the producers, transmitters, and recipients of rumors are also not fixed. Whether the claim originates from political motives or is a misheard message, as the media conveys it, experts add interpretations, and users amplify and reproduce it on social media, a single source comes to appear as multiple pieces of evidence. The acceptance inherent in a divided society—the belief that "if it is North Korea, it could happen"—makes repeated information feel even more authentic.

The true essence of journalism lies in enabling readers to judge the boundaries between confirmed facts, conjectures, and the unknown. To achieve this, three things are necessary. First, when dealing with rumors, sources, grounds, and counter-evidence must be placed at the center of the article. Posting suspicions in the headline and hiding behind the word "unconfirmed" at the end of the text cannot, in terms of journalistic ethics, replace the role of fact-checking. Second, intelligence agencies and public communicators must clearly distinguish between intelligence, conjecture, and confirmed facts when conveying them. Third, if an error is confirmed, the original text must be corrected immediately, and interpretations based on that error must also be rectified. Simply denying that a false report was published does not absolve one of responsibility for fueling baseless suspicions with a "take it or leave it" attitude. Ultimately, the problem lies not in a lack of information, but in the desire and expectation to intervene in judgment. "Motivated reasoning" operates most strongly when one believes they are rational. Even amidst the anxiety of division, the media can regain the trust lost to repeated false reports when it verifies facts and corrects errors using consistent standards.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the center.)