[Kiho Han's Column] We Must Overcome 'Korea Passing' Amidst the Atmosphere of North Korea-U.S. Dialogue

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

President Trump, who stormed out of the Metropol Hanoi Hotel on February 28, 2019, is once again reaching out to Chairman Kim Jong Un. On August 19, he announced at the White House that he would “meet Chairman Kim Jong Un later this year,” and on the 17th, he stated that he had received a “very positive” response from Chairman Kim to his offer for dialogue. At the same time, citing South Korea’s lukewarm reaction to a war with Iran, he drastically reduced the scale of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises without prior notice. In response, Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, dismissed the U.S. reduction of joint exercises as unlikely to yield the desired answer, while mentioning the friendship between the two leaders and emphasizing that they would not engage in dialogue unless the U.S. “hostile policy” itself is withdrawn (Korean Central News Agency, August 20). Thus, while North Korea has not responded immediately to Trump’s offer for dialogue, it appears poised to seize this opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward North Korea and to secure recognition as a nuclear power that may not come again.

Ultimately, Chairman Kim’s confidence that “time is in our favor” (Supreme People’s Assembly, September 2025) was not mere empty words. This statement was made while he was emboldened by the restoration of the military alliance with Russia and the recovery of relations with China on the occasion of Victory Day, taking advantage of the New Cold War order brought about by the Russo-U.S. War. Seven years and six months have passed since the Hanoi no-deal. The opportune moment is approaching for North Korea, which has refrained from direct criticism of the U.S. President and focused on a power struggle rather than technological advancement, to demand the ransom it has inflated significantly.

The key point is that the nature of the current North Korea-U.S. dialogue is completely different from that of the first Trump administration. It is estimated that North Korea has increased its nuclear arsenal to around 60 units since the bitter experience in Hanoi (the South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimates 80 to 120 units), and it has continuously accumulated enough fissile material to manufacture several nuclear warheads annually through the reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the expansion of uranium enrichment facilities. Furthermore, North Korea has enhanced its capability to strike the U.S. mainland through the test development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19. It has also devoted itself to diversifying and advancing missile delivery systems by advancing miniaturization and lightweighting technologies to mount tactical nuclear warheads (such as the 'Hwasan-31') on various types of missiles capable of reaching the entire Korean peninsula, including super-large multiple rocket launchers (600mm), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It has codified its nuclear doctrine by adopting the Nuclear Forces Policy Law, including the conditional preemptive use of nuclear weapons (Supreme People's Assembly, September 2022), and has reached a point where it seeks a change in its strategic status by withstanding sanctions through close ties with China and Russia, including military and economic cooperation. Consequently, North Korea will likely seek to lure its counterpart to the negotiating table to secure a strategic status equivalent to that of a de facto nuclear power, rather than engaging in denuclearization negotiations with the United States.

This is where the opportunities and risks of Trump's diplomacy arise simultaneously. Dialogue between the leaders of North Korea and the United States is, in itself, a welcome development. Given the advanced state of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, communication between the two leaders can serve as a safeguard to reduce the possibility of accidental miscalculations and military conflict. The question, however, is whether the "diplomatic achievements" required by President Trump necessarily align with South Korea's national interests. Even at the White House press conference on August 17, he mentioned the reduction of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and the proposal for North Korea-U.S. dialogue in the context of criticizing the excessive U.S. defense burden on South Korea and South Korea's refusal of military support for the Strait of Hormuz. Concerns regarding "Korea Passing" have emerged in some domestic circles, raising fears that the U.S. might engage in dialogue without considering South Korea's security conditions. Arguments for achieving nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula through the "redispatch of tactical nuclear weapons" are not unrelated to this perspective. North Korea-U.S. "Korea Passing"... There is a sense of déjà vu regarding the situation around the time of the 1994 North Korea-U.S. Geneva Agreement, when the Kim Young-sam administration conveyed a verbal message to President Bill Clinton through then-Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo, stating that the U.S. government was accelerating the improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations without progress in inter-Korean dialogue, calling it "too fast."

The problem is likely not so much the North Korea-U.S. dialogue itself, which excludes South Korea, but rather the behavior of North Korea and the U.S. in politically trading matters directly linked to South Korea's security interests without prior coordination. Therefore, South Korea's strategy must be to be involved in the preparatory stage to ensure that the hard-won dialogue does not result in a crude agreement.

First, if a North Korea-U.S. summit is held, prior coordination between South Korea and the U.S. must be institutionalized. Matters related to denuclearization, sanctions, and the peace regime, as well as U.S. Forces Korea, extended deterrence, and the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture, cannot be subject to negotiation between North Korea and the U.S. without South Korea's consent. It is fortunate that during the phone call between the South Korean and U.S. foreign ministers on August 24, the two countries agreed to continue close cooperation regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean Peninsula while maintaining a “firm ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.” Second, what South Korea and the U.S. realistically need to pursue is a “negotiation that does not abandon denuclearization, but does not wait solely for it.” This approach involves preventing further advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities through phased measures—such as suspending nuclear and missile tests, freezing nuclear material production, declaring and verifying nuclear facilities, and limiting long-range missiles—and linking these measures to sanctions relief, security guarantees, and the normalization of relations. This aligns with the current administration’s phased approach, which involves freezing nuclear development in the short term, followed by the reduction of nuclear materials and confidence-building, ultimately leading to denuclearization in the long term. Third, South Korea needs to step forward not merely as a mediator, but as a party involved and a co-designer. During the G7 meeting last June, President Lee asked President Trump to take the lead in the peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue, to which President Trump replied that he would make an effort. During the phone call between the South Korean and U.S. foreign ministers on August 24, Seoul expressed its intention to strive to ensure that President Trump's recent messages lead to North Korea-U.S. dialogue and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Improving inter-Korean relations remains a distant prospect if Seoul remains in the position of the "pitiful Seoul" that North Korea mocks.

The biggest diplomatic opportunity ahead is expected to be the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, in November. On August 18, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration is considering plans for a summit with Kim Jong-un in the fall, and that a meeting on the sidelines of the Shenzhen APEC summit is also being discussed. As the South Korean media is also treating this as a major scenario, behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts are necessary to ensure that the Korean Peninsula agenda can be discussed between the U.S. and Chinese leaders during President Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. in September. However, since North Korea is not an APEC member, if an actual meeting takes place, it is highly likely to be held as a separate North Korea-U.S. summit rather than as part of an official APEC meeting.

The U.S. midterm elections are also a variable. For President Trump, a summit with Kim Jong-un could serve as a symbolic diplomatic achievement to demonstrate amidst a complex foreign policy environment. Therefore, November presents an incentive for both North Korea and the United States to accelerate the negotiation timetable. Consequently, what our government should focus on is not the holding of the talks itself, but the content of the agreement. Since we cannot rule out the possibility that joint ROK-US military exercises, sanctions against North Korea, the nuclear issue, and the peace regime could be bundled into a single package if North Korea-US dialogue is realized merely for the sake of a deal, efforts are required to secure a "managed deal" that reflects peace on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea's security interests. In other words, we must create a structure that lowers military tensions and deters further enhancements of North Korea's nuclear capabilities in the short term, while maintaining the long-term goal of complete denuclearization, and simultaneously avoiding undermining the credibility of the ROK-US alliance and extended deterrence.

As a result, the Hanoi "no deal" has significantly raised the threshold for a third North Korea-US summit. Ultimately, the strategy required of South Korea now is not passive diplomacy asking to be "prevented from being passed over," but active diplomacy that places South Korea's national interests between the conditions demanded by North Korea and the incentives the United States can offer.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the center.)