[Kiho Han's Column] The Politics of Calling, From North Korea Back to Joseon

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

It is the 73rd anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. Since the sound of war shelling ceased on the Korean Peninsula, enough time has passed for a person to be born and grow old. During this time, countless events and incidents have been engraved into the tree rings of division between the South and the North. However, a declaration capable of shaking the very foundation of the division system came from the North in late 2023, the year marking the 70th anniversary of the armistice. They have voluntarily abandoned the concept of "compatriots," which they had used as the justification for their so-called "War of National Liberation." Moreover, they have finally incorporated the contradictory behavior of transitioning to a relationship between two states—"Korea" and "South Korea"—into the institution of a revised constitution, while leaving the state of hostile belligerence (war) intact. Perhaps a severance of ties with the South, which occasionally disrupted their united front, was necessary during the process of establishing nuclear status and implementing "our nation first" ideology, which has been advocated during the Kim Jong-un era.

The long-standing designation "South Korea," used in North Korea since the liberation in 1945—politically dating back to the Workers' Party of South Korea (Namro Party) in 1946—has now been replaced by "Republic of Korea" (Korea). Since differences in terminology reflect differences in systems and ideologies, regardless of whether this is positive or negative, the institutional shift in North Korea's relations with the South can be evaluated as a highly noteworthy event in the history of inter-Korean relations since the division. The system of division implies the existence of another party looking at the other. Calling someone by their proper name is the beginning of establishing a relationship and the most fundamental declaration of acknowledging their existence as it is. However, for over half a century on the Korean Peninsula, the names of the other side have always been a battleground of political censorship and ideological hostility. In South Korea, the North Korean regime was long referred to as "North puppets" (Bukgoe), denying its very existence, and even after the easing of the Cold War, it remained trapped within the designation "North Korea," a defense concept centered solely on South Korea. It is a well-known fact that, contrary to the fierce backlash within the military at the time of the publication of the '1989 Defense White Paper'—which first referred to the North Korean regime as 'North Korea'—North Korea has also denied our legitimacy by calling us the 'South Korean puppets.' However, the international political environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the paradigm of national identity are fundamentally being shaken. As mentioned above, North Korea has formalized the 'two hostile states' theory and, through a constitutional amendment, erased the concepts of unification and nation, explicitly defining the Republic of Korea within the scope of its southern borders. Within South Korean society as well, the Minister of Unification has stood at the center of heated public debate after referring to inter-Korean relations as 'Han-Jo (Korea-Joseon) relations' at an official academic conference and proposing the public discussion of using North Korea's official national name, the 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea' (abbreviated as 'Joseon'). Now, for the sake of peaceful coexistence under the national aspiration of unification, it is necessary to devise measures to acknowledge the reality of the other side, starting with the way we address each other. As early as September 24, 1991, immediately after South and North Korea simultaneously joined the United Nations, former President Roh Tae-woo stated in his keynote address at the 46th UN General Assembly, "At this General Assembly, our brother, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has also become a member state alongside the Republic of Korea. I consider it deeply meaningful to walk the path of peace and unification together with our brothers in the North, and I sincerely congratulate them on their admission." At the time, his remarks were not domestically condemned as a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution or as pro-communist activity. Is it right now and wrong then? Or was it right then and wrong now?

The realization that we should respect the other side's national name is not a recent phenomenon. The "Guidelines for News Production for Peaceful Unification and Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation (1995)," jointly established by three active media organizations—the Journalists Association of Korea, the National Union of Media Workers, and the Korean PD Association—to mark the 50th anniversary of Korea's liberation, had already set a milestone for overcoming Cold War-era linguistic perspectives. The core principles were to "broaden the consensus between the South and North by producing objective reports free from the preconceptions and prejudices formed during the Cold War era" and to "refrain from using harsh expressions that provoke or slander the other side." Article 1 of the General Provisions of the guidelines stipulated, "We acknowledge the reality of the South and North divided into the Republic of Korea (abbreviated as Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (abbreviated as Korea), and in preparation for mutual respect and peaceful unification, we use the other side's national name and title exactly as they are." The reason the media industry established these guidelines at the time was that they had empirically recognized that the risk of misjudgment and conflict increases as linguistic hostility intensifies. The proposal today to refer to North Korea by its official national name, "Joseon," is precisely an act of inheriting and developing the spirit of the 1995 press guidelines to suit the realities of the 21st century.

Of course, I am well aware that there is considerable negative public opinion within South Korean society regarding calling North Korea "Joseon." Critics warn that the moment North Korea is officially recognized as "Joseon," the legal framework of the "special relationship aiming for unification" under Article 3 (Territorial Clause) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Act on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations could collapse. In particular, given that North Korea defines inter-Korean relations as "two hostile states" denying even national homogeneity, critics point out that using their official name could inadvertently lead us into North Korea's strategy of solidifying the division. Furthermore, even those who are negative about the nation and unification may harbor resentment toward referring to North Korea as "Joseon." However, such concerns are the result of a rigid interpretation of the diplomatic and strategic utility of such designations. Calling the other side by its official name is by no means an act of acquiescence to praising their ideology or condoning their illegal regime activities. The example of West Germany, which referred to East Germany as the German Democratic Republic (DDR) through official government designations and the media prior to reunification while using the colloquial national term "Drüben" (the other side) in everyday life, may serve as a point of reference. However, existing laws containing the designation "North Korea"—such as the "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation," the "Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of North Korean Defectors," and the "North Korean Human Rights Act"—must either be retained or followed by technical reviews that ensure the intent of the laws is not undermined, accompanied by procedures for gathering public opinion.

North Korea is already an undeniably independent sovereign state that is a member of the United Nations and uses the official name "DPRK" on the international stage. This leads us to reflect on whether the "intrinsic research method" advocated by North Korean studies researchers, including myself, was truly intended to understand North Korea or to understand Chosun. Only when the counterpart is viewed as an objective subject of research can an effective strategy toward North Korea be established without distortion. Even though North Korea did not refer to the Republic of Korea by name three years ago out of mutual respect, this holds significant meaning as an opportunity to reconsider the concept of "North Korea" that has been consumed for nearly 80 years under the system of division. What should be done first? A process of public deliberation that considers public sentiment and constitutional controversies—involving the government, the media, academia, and civil society—is essential. At the very least, on international multilateral stages such as sporting events, the UN General Assembly, ASEAN, and the ARF, efforts must be made to refer to the country as DPRK rather than North Korea, in accordance with international conventions and the reporting and production guidelines of the domestic media. Once the convention of naming becomes established in public spaces, it can be gradually expanded to domestic social, academic, and cultural fields. Starting with the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games this coming September, the farce of North Korean athletes walking out of press conferences in protest over the naming issue must not be repeated on the international sports stage. It is important to foster domestic trust that respect for the other party's national name—as a minimum diplomatic signal for dialogue and coexistence—and the grammar of peace beginning with calling them by the name "Joseon" will, at the very least, not worsen the situation on the Korean Peninsula compared to the present.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the center.)