[Kiho Han's Column] Pyongyang's Hospitality, Beijing's Calculus

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

On June 8, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un personally greeted Chinese President Xi Jinping upon his arrival at Pyongyang Sunan Airport. When large portraits of the two leaders hung side by side in Kim Il Sung Square, the international community took notice of the highest level of close protocol, a reenactment of the past seven years. This meeting, in which they agreed to comprehensively expand exchanges not only in diplomacy and the economy but also in military fields, appears on the surface to be the "restoration of a solid blood alliance." However, a closer look at the structural interests hidden behind the lavish rhetoric reveals that this trip to Pyongyang was a decision based on Chinese geopolitical calculations, thoroughly mindful of nationalism and hegemonic competition. On the other hand, it also represents a small victory for North Korea's "pendulum diplomacy" amidst the diplomatic relations between North Korea, China, and Russia, taking advantage of the loosening of the U.S.-led international order.

The New York Times assessed this visit as a highly strategic move aimed at improving relations with North Korea, which had tilted sharply toward Russia following the war in Ukraine, and at regaining influence over the North. The BBC also noted that "this visit to North Korea is not merely for the purpose of fostering friendship, but rather to strengthen leverage over the North," drawing attention to China's thorough cost-benefit analysis that differed from the facade. It is true that interpretations regarding the true intentions behind President Xi Jinping's visit were divided, as it took place amidst assessments that the North Korea-China relationship—once likened to the idiom 'lips and teeth'—was showing cracks due to North Korea's moves toward closer ties with Russia. Since the close ties between North Korea and Russia invited Chinese intervention and, consequently, appeared to legitimize North Korea's enhanced diplomatic standing, Chairman Kim Jong-un's preparation of grand protocol was, in a sense, a natural outcome. The red Five-Starred Red Flags filling Pyongyang Sunan Airport and the lavish welcoming crowds appeared, on the surface, to be a perfect restoration of the blood alliance between North Korea and China. Such a performance was also not a bad warning message directed at the United States. However, a closer look at the inner workings of Northeast Asian geopolitics reveals that President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Pyongyang reflects China's strategic anxiety aimed at curbing the rapidly deepening ties between North Korea and Russia, rather than a mere display of solidarity. In retrospect, the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Putin and Kim Jong-un, following North Korea's deployment of troops to the war in Ukraine, presented China with a massive diplomatic and security dilemma. For North Korea to degenerate into a Russian outpost—much like Belarus in Eastern Europe—and drive military tensions in Northeast Asia out of control, was by no means a scenario desired by China, which has tirelessly emphasized stability in the region.

Conversely, from Russia's perspective, while it seeks to counter the U.S.-led world order through strengthening the strategic partnership between North Korea and China or a trilateral alliance among North Korea, China, and Russia, it harbors complex feelings regarding China taking the lead on the North Korean nuclear issue or excessively expanding its influence in Northeast Asia. Russia's calculation, having already accepted North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli, is to seek a balance where China does not undermine the influence it has established over North Korea.

From China's standpoint, the fundamental fear in Northeast Asian geopolitics lies in the fact that the reckless actions of North Korea and Russia could create a backlash that unprecedentedly strengthens security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and further draws NATO's influence into the Asia-Pacific region. CNN noted that "unlike in the past, President Xi did not mention the phrase 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' even once during this visit to North Korea." Through this visit to North Korea, President Xi sought to block North Korea's so-called "security-Russia-economic-China" policy—which relies on Russia for security and China for the economy—by avoiding any mention of the nuclear issue. This is a manifestation of geopolitics aimed at firmly binding North Korea under China's influence, even at the expense of the nuclear issue.

If so, has denuclearization diplomacy come to an end? A look at the sophisticated psychological warfare hidden within North Korean and Chinese media reports reveals a nature of "different dreams." Taking this visit as an opportunity, it is impossible to shake the impression that while the state-run media of both countries outwardly call for solidarity, they are pursuing thoroughly different calculations internally. In an article contributed to the Rodong Sinmun (June 8), the official newspaper of the Workers' Party of Korea, President Xi emphasized the need to "jointly promote global multipolarity and inclusive economic globalization," defining the development of North Korea-China relations as an "essential task in turbulent times." Notably, unlike in the past, China intentionally omitted the phrase "Korean Peninsula issue" and adopted an attitude of tacit approval regarding North Korea's regime and nuclear possession by stating that it "firmly supports the socialist path suited to each country's circumstances and mutual sovereignty."

In contrast, the People's Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, and the state-run Xinhua News Agency maintained a restrained tone while reporting on the summit held at the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, aiming to avoid being fully drawn into a full-scale confrontation with the West. Internal Chinese reporting distanced itself from the military closeness shown by North Korea and Russia, adhering to a framework of managing North Korea as a buffer zone on the front line of the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry. This stands in stark contrast to a welcoming editorial in the Rodong Sinmun (June 8), which explicitly anticipated China's role as an unconditional economic and security barrier, calling for "developing traditional North Korea-China friendship to meet the demands of the new era." What is clear is that there has been no explicit change in China's stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s remark during a briefing on the day of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang—that "China’s position and policy regarding the Korean Peninsula issue maintain continuity and stability"—demonstrates that China is adhering to a strategic stance between North and South Korea that takes into account bilateral relations. As analyzed by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a U.S. security think tank, China is effectively orchestrating a sophisticated system of strategic guardianship through its state-run media. While tacitly condoning the smuggling of North Korean minerals and the supply of refined oil to circumvent UN Security Council sanctions, China coordinates the situation to prevent North Korea’s reckless behavior from completely destroying its economic relations with Europe and the United States.

What, then, is South Korea’s alternative? Amidst the surging tide of hyper-close ties between North Korea and China and tacit approval of the North Korean nuclear issue, the existing grammar of South Korean diplomacy appears to have run its course. General Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, sparked considerable controversy by likening South Korea to a "dagger aimed at China" (May 22). Taking an ambiguous stance amidst the U.S.-China conflict, or remaining fixated solely on the slogan of strengthening alliances through trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, will not allow us to overcome the structural closeness of North Korea, China, and Russia, nor the North Korean nuclear threat.

South Korea must now break free from its predicament of being sandwiched between the two nations and shift to an aggressive diplomacy focused on national interests, holding the card of independent security survival capable of shaking up the landscape. What China fears most regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula is the spread of independent nuclear armament arguments in South Korea and Japan, as well as the permanent deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula and surrounding waters. Foreign media also point out the need for a strategic shift for South Korea. Foreign policy publications such as Bloomberg predict that as the security landscape of Northeast Asia shifts, South Korea will face internal and external pressure to secure independent deterrence. We must place these potential cards on the table and use them as powerful leverage against China. We must clearly warn the leadership in Beijing and Washington that if China condones North Korea's nuclear advancement and smuggling activities, South Korea may also consider security choices for the sake of national survival. In other words, we must impress upon China that appropriately controlling North Korea's military objectives is also beneficial to its national security interests. Only shrewd diplomacy—strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance while refusing to leave our survival to the goodwill of other nations—is the sole path to navigating the coming turbulence.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the center.)