[kiho Han's Column] Looking at North Korea's 9th Party Congress in the Year of the Ox

Dr. Kiho Han, Director (Associate Professor) of the Research Laboratory at the Ajou University Institute for Unification Studies and Affiliated Research Fellow at CUKPE

North Korea's largest political event, the 9th Workers' Party of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the "Party Congress"), is expected to be held no later than the first quarter of next year, despite differing opinions on the timing. This Congress, which coincides with the remainder of President Lee Jae-myung's term, will directly inform the current administration's policy toward the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's Party Congress serves as an opportunity to assess the accomplishments of the past period, present new directions and strategic goals, and formally adopt action guidelines for the next five years, officially declaring the start of a new political cycle both domestically and internationally. Most importantly, it allows for revisions to the Workers' Party's highest norm, the Party Charter. After 36 years of delay since the 6th Party Congress in 1980, the Party Congress has been held every five years since the 7th Congress in 2016, which elected Kim Jong-un as First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Chairman. While the general consensus is that it's difficult to expect a meaningful shift in South Korea policy in the immediate future, a comprehensive assessment of the post-8th Party Congress and the outlook for the upcoming 9th Party Congress can be the first step toward fully assessing the current state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, a place where "two families live under one roof."

In fact, the decision adopted at the 8th Party Congress, which announced the launch of the second term of the Kim Jong-un regime, was limited to press releases, unlike the 7th Party Congress, which was fully disclosed. However, it did signal several directions. First, the 8th Party Congress was a feast of internal unity, driven by a frontal breakthrough, adorned with three key slogans: "People before Heaven," "Single-Minded Unity," and "Self-Reliance." This is why the Party Congress was necessary amidst accumulating internal fatigue amidst the uncertainty and economic difficulties of the 2021 COVID-19 pandemic and typhoon damage. Second, it represented a shift in emphasis from the military to the economy. At the 7th Party Congress, the "Byungjin" line, which stipulated in the preamble to the Workers' Party's rules for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development, was deleted and replaced with "self-reliance economic construction." In other words, while the North Korean economy during the Byungjin period presented five-year strategic goals centered on development and growth, shouldering the burden of achieving them, the "Five-Year Plan" presented at the 8th Party Congress can be seen as a shift toward focusing on visible, small-scale achievements such as local industry, housing, and hospitals, with an emphasis on stability and maintenance, and on improving living standards. Notably, the shift in the status of nuclear weapons, with "nuclear advancement" becoming an absolute prerequisite for regime survival, is a shift away from the burden of the previous line, which promised both nuclear and economic achievements, to a survival line that manages the regime based on nuclear weapons. This shift represents a prelude to establishing nuclear power status as a fait accompli and simultaneously committing to a long-term confrontation with the United States. Third, while maintaining the policy of unification and nationalism, the scope of socialist construction is becoming a reality. The current rules, revised at the 8th Party Congress, explicitly state that "national reunification" and "common prosperity of the nation" are the Workers' Party's fighting goals. However, they define "building a prosperous and civilized socialist society" as the Workers' Party's immediate objective, limiting it to the "northern half of the Republic." At the same time, the phrase "carrying out the tasks of the national liberation democratic revolution on a nationwide scale" was deleted or softened, sparking debate among domestic experts about the validity of the "South Korean revolution theory."

North Korea has already completed its policy review of the plans presented at the 8th Party Congress in 2021 at the 13th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, which took place over three days from the 9th. In particular, in the military and economic sectors, they generously assessed themselves, stating, "Many problems have been effectively and correctly resolved, and we are moving in the right direction for development," and "This year's economic development goals and the five-year plan have been completed." On the 18th, the Chosun Sinbo, the organ of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, also followed suit, stating that "material and technological guarantees for expanded production have been established" over the past five years and defining the period following the 9th Party Congress as "an era of unprecedented, miraculous dynamism." This stands in stark contrast to Chairman Kim's admission at the 8th Party Congress that the implementation of the five-year national economic development strategy has been severely inadequate in almost every sector.

So, what choices will North Korea make over the next five years? The core message of the 9th Party Congress is likely not to be a major shift in policy direction, but rather a stage for politically concluding and institutionalizing the policy established over the past five years. North Korea's actions since the 8th Party Congress have been relatively consistent, and recent messages from the Rodong Sinmun and Korean Central Television suggest that the next direction has entered a phase of internal refining.

First, there is the possibility of a Party Congress focused on summarizing achievements. Recurring phrases in recent plenary sessions and on-the-spot guidance reports include "decisive stage," "summary," and "laying the foundation for a new phase of development." This suggests that the upcoming Party Congress will be characterized as a review of the achievements of the 8th Party Congress's five-year plan, confirmation of the political stability of Kim Jong-un's second term, and manageable advancement into the next phase. Second, the goal is to move beyond the completion of nuclear weapons to the "routine" phase and implement a parallel policy of conventional defense. First, the existing policy of defining nuclear weapons as a constant for national existence rather than a bargaining chip has been reaffirmed. Furthermore, the credibility of the war deterrent has been secured. Furthermore, North Korea is likely to continue its ostentatious behavior, repeating existing language such as "responsible nuclear state" to justify its nuclear possession. On September 13th, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced at the 9th Party Congress that it would propose a policy of parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces. Third, the revision of the Workers' Party of Korea's regulations reflecting the changing perception of South Korea and the United States. Since the December 2023 Plenary Session of the Party defined the relationship between "two hostile states, two belligerents at war," the possibility of a constitutional amendment and the Workers' Party of Korea regulations reflecting this trend have been consistently raised. Until recently, Chairman Kim has consistently characterized military movements by South Korea, the United States, and Japan as "threats" while inspecting the progress of nuclear-powered submarines. Domestically, internal propaganda promoting "confrontational North Korea-South Korea relations" has become routine and entrenched. Relations with the United States are also expected to maintain a framework of long-term confrontation management rather than hasty proposals for dialogue. Fourth, economic stabilization through the internal policy of "local development" is crucial. The completion ceremonies for local industrial plants, hospitals, and residential housing, attended by Chairman Kim in particular over the past month, including in Sinpo City, symbolize the direction of the 9th Party Congress, which the Rodong Sinmun describes as a "new era of local development" and a "substantial improvement in people's lives." Considering the emphasis placed on local production and service infrastructure to normalize the economy and demonstrate internal solidarity following the 8th Party Congress, the core economic messages of the 9th Party Congress are expected to include: securing a governing foundation through the achievements of the 20x10 local development policy; and cultivating the image of a "state capable of overcoming obstacles" amidst prolonged sanctions. Ultimately, this will be a forum for formalizing an internally integrated economic model based on flexible isolation and support from China and Russia. Finally, rather than a power reorganization, it is highly likely that North Korea will focus on promoting Kim Jong-un's revolutionary ideology, highlighting organizational and policy issues.

Ultimately, North Korea's 9th Party Congress will not mark the beginning of a new path, but rather a political declaration of commitment to following a chosen path to the end. On the 21st, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova issued a statement refusing to discuss inter-Korean relations with South Korea and tolerating North Korea's nuclear program, demonstrating the close alliance between the two countries. The Lee Jae-myung administration also announced a shift toward "peaceful bilateral relations oriented toward unification" in the Ministry of Unification's work plan for next year on the 19th. While preparing for a prolonged crisis, we hope that the Year of the Horse will be one in which the enemy exploits not only North Korea-US negotiations but also major and minor events related to the Korean Peninsula situation, such as the Shenzhen APEC and the Pyongyang ATTU Asian Junior Championships, which are scheduled for the new year.

(This article was originally published as a column in Aju News in Korean and translated into English with the help of Google Translate. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official stance of the center.)